Interpreting the de re/de dido distinction that does not appeal to RTM,

104 J. A. FODOR
interpreting the de re/de dido distinction that does not appeal to RTM; one
that does not assume that de dicto specifications exhibit the way the content
of a propositional attitude is mentally represented.)
Anyhow, for the moment I am not arguing that Putnam's views about
what "water2" means cannot be reconciled with Grice's views about how
meanings are related to mental states. I am arguing only that you should
not just assume, on Gricean grounds, that accepting Putnam's intuitions about
the meanings of English2 expressions closes the issue about how the communicative
intentions of English2 speakers ought to be described. To put
the point more succinctly: so far we have arguments that molecularly identical
people can speak different languages, but we have no argument for the
conclusion that would make a difference to cognitive scientists; viz., that
molecularly identical people can differ in their de dicto propositional attitudes.
One way to get the latter conclusion is to assume Grice's principle that
difference in de dicto propositional attitudes of speaker/hearers can be
inferred from differences in the meanings of the linguistic forms they use.
But this inference is not available to Putnam. Grice's principle cannot be
assumed by a theorist who holds that meanings are not in the head not at least
without some further tinkering.
So here is the question that I am claiming Putnam's discussion leaves
open and the answer to which I am claiming is essential to understanding
the implications of Putnam's examples for the cognitive science project. What
communicative intentions do speakers of English2 use such verbal forms
as "water2 is wet" to express? Or, to put much the same question slightly
differently: What de dicto belief is a speaker of English2 claiming to have
when he says that he believes that water2 is wet? Or, to put the question
slightly differently again: What statement is "water2 is wet" standardly
used to make in English2? (Perhaps these three questions are not in fact
equivalent; it hardly matters for the discussion that follows since it does
seem clear that if we knew how to answer any one of them we would be
well on our way to answering the rest.) I will now run through some answers
that are wrong in edifying ways. In the long run, I shall be claiming that there
is no way of answering these questions compatible with preserving Putnam's
intuitions about what "water2" means; hence that Putnam's intuitions must
be misled.
First gambit: "Water2 is wet" is used to express the de dicto belief that
water2 is wet. Reply, this proposal is unhelpful since it is part and parcel
of our quandary that we do not know which belief the belief that water2 is
wet is. One way to see the difficulty is to notice that since "water2" is not,
strictly speaking, an expression of English, the formula "'water 2 is wet'
expresses the belief that water2 is wet" is not, strictly speaking, well formed.
(Compare " Ί a plume est sur la table' is true iff la plume is on the table".)
What we need, of course, is a convention for understanding "water2" when
it occurs used (as opposed to mentioned) in English sentences. The present
proposal is thus unstable since what it claims about the de dicto propositional
attitudes of English2 speakers will depend entirely upon which such convention
we adopt. If, for example, we decide that "water2" translates as "water",
then the proposal reduces to " 'water2 is wet' expresses the de dicto belief that